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Abstract
Introduction
While evidence that alcohol pricing policies reduce alcohol-related health harm is robust,
and alcohol taxation increases are aWHO “best buy” intervention, there is a lack of research
comparing the scale and distribution across society of health impacts arising from alternative
tax and price policy options. The aim of this study is to test whether four common alcohol tax-
ation and pricing strategies differ in their impact on health inequalities.
Methods and Findings
An econometric epidemiological model was built with England 2014/2015 as the setting.
Four pricing strategies implemented on top of the current tax were equalised to give the
same 4.3% population-wide reduction in total alcohol-related mortality: current tax increase,
a 13.4% all-product duty increase under the current UK system; a value-based tax, a 4.0%
ad valorem tax based on product price; a strength-based tax, a volumetric tax of £0.22 per
UK alcohol unit (= 8 g of ethanol); and minimum unit pricing, a minimum price threshold of
£0.50 per unit, below which alcohol cannot be sold. Model inputs were calculated by com-
bining data from representative household surveys on alcohol purchasing and consump-
tion, administrative and healthcare data on 43 alcohol-attributable diseases, and published
price elasticities and relative risk functions. Outcomes were annual per capita consumption,
consumer spending, and alcohol-related deaths. Uncertainty was assessed via partial prob-
abilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) and scenario analysis.
The pricing strategies differ as to how effects are distributed across the population, and,
from a public health perspective, heavy drinkers in routine/manual occupations are a key
group as they are at greatest risk of health harm from their drinking. Strength-based taxation
and minimum unit pricing would have greater effects on mortality among drinkers in routine/
manual occupations (particularly for heavy drinkers, where the estimated policy effects on
PLOSMedicine | DOI:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963 February 23, 2016 1 / 27
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Meier PS, Holmes J, Angus C, Ally AK,
Meng Y, Brennan A (2016) Estimated Effects of
Different Alcohol Taxation and Price Policies on
Health Inequalities: A Mathematical Modelling Study.
PLoS Med 13(2): e1001963. doi:10.1371/journal.
pmed.1001963
Academic Editor: Sanjay Basu, Stanford University,
UNITED STATES
Received: April 30, 2015
Accepted: January 15, 2016
Published: February 23, 2016
Copyright: © 2016 Meier et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are
credited.
Data Availability Statement: S1 Data gives details
on how other researchers can access each of the
underlying data sources. The authors are not the
owners of the data, therefore other researchers would
need to also register with or approach the data
owners.
Funding: The development of SAPM v3 was funded
by Medical Research Council/Economic and Social
Research Council joint grant G1000043 (PSM was
chief investigator; AB co-investigator; and JH, YM,
AKA, and CA are researchers whose salaries were
part-funded from the grant). JH’s, AKA’s, and CA’s
mortality rates are as follows: current tax increase, −3.2%; value-based tax, −2.9%;
strength-based tax, −6.1%; minimum unit pricing, −7.8%) and lesser impacts among drink-
ers in professional/managerial occupations (for heavy drinkers: current tax increase,
−1.3%; value-based tax, −1.4%; strength-based tax, +0.2%; minimum unit pricing, +0.8%).
Results from the PSA give slightly greater mean effects for both the routine/manual (current
tax increase, −3.6% [95% uncertainty interval (UI) −6.1%, −0.6%]; value-based tax, −3.3%
[UI −5.1%, −1.7%]; strength-based tax, −7.5% [UI −13.7%, −3.9%]; minimum unit pricing,
−10.3% [UI −10.3%, −7.0%]) and professional/managerial occupation groups (current tax
increase, −1.8% [UI −4.7%, +1.6%]; value-based tax, −1.9% [UI −3.6%, +0.4%]; strength-
based tax, −0.8% [UI −6.9%, +4.0%]; minimum unit pricing, −0.7% [UI −5.6%, +3.6%]).
Impacts of price changes on moderate drinkers were small regardless of income or socio-
economic group. Analysis of uncertainty shows that the relative effectiveness of the four pol-
icies is fairly stable, although uncertainty in the absolute scale of effects exists. Volumetric
taxation and minimum unit pricing consistently outperform increasing the current tax or
adding an ad valorem tax in terms of reducing mortality among the heaviest drinkers and
reducing alcohol-related health inequalities (e.g., in the routine/manual occupation group,
volumetric taxation reduces deaths more than increasing the current tax in 26 out of 30
probabilistic runs, minimum unit pricing reduces deaths more than volumetric tax in 21 out
of 30 runs, and minimum unit pricing reduces deaths more than increasing the current tax in
30 out of 30 runs). Study limitations include reducing model complexity by not considering a
largely ineffective ban on below-tax alcohol sales, special duty rates covering only small
shares of the market, and the impact of tax fraud or retailer non-compliance with minimum
unit prices.
Conclusions
Our model estimates that, compared to tax increases under the current system or introduc-
ing taxation based on product value, alcohol-content-based taxation or minimum unit pricing
would lead to larger reductions in health inequalities across income groups. We also esti-
mate that alcohol-content-based taxation and minimum unit pricing would have the largest
impact on harmful drinking, with minimal effects on those drinking in moderation.
Introduction
Harmful alcohol consumption is a major public health issue accounting for an estimated 2.7
million deaths globally, and, together with high blood pressure, smoking, air pollution, and
unhealthy diet, it is ranked among the five leading contributors to the global burden of disease
[1]. Estimates of the economic costs attributable to alcohol amount to more than 1% of gross
domestic product in high-income and middle-income countries [2]. There is also a substantial
social gradient in the burden of disease attributable to alcohol, such that it is disproportionately
concentrated in disadvantaged groups. Thus, the most effective public policies to reduce alco-
hol harm are likely to reduce persistent and growing disparities in health, a major goal of popu-
lation health policies in developed countries [3,4].
Links between alcohol price increases and reductions in consumption [5–7], alcohol-related
mortality [8], and healthcare costs [9,10] are well established. Consequently, the World Health
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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Organization (WHO) recommends alcohol taxation as amongst the most cost-effective options
for tackling alcohol-related ill health [10]. Of 167 countries responding to a WHO survey in
2010, 154 collected some form of alcohol taxes [11], although the way these taxes were calcu-
lated differs markedly between countries and states. Three dominant tax structures are used
internationally, either singly or in combination: (1) ad valorem tax (proportionate to product
value), a component of alcohol taxes in 96 countries; (2) volumetric tax (based on product
strength/ethanol content), a tax component in 50 countries and (3) unitary tax (based on prod-
uct volume), a tax component in 41 countries [11]. Examples of tax structures are given in
Box 1.
Several countries employ or are considering additional price-based alcohol control measures
alongside taxation. In particular, an alcohol-content-based minimum price (or floor price)
below which products cannot be sold is in force in parts of Canada and the Russian Federation
and has been proposed in Ireland, the UK, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia.
Differential effects of alcohol pricing policies across socioeconomic groups and the resulting
impacts on health inequalities are of great importance to both the political and legal debate.
Politically, the alcohol industry and policy opponents argue that alcohol taxation and mini-
mum pricing “penalise” low-income moderate drinkers and are thus regressive and poorly tar-
geted [12]. From a legal perspective, the comparative effectiveness of different price-based
public health interventions across outcomes including health inequalities is a key issue in Euro-
pean law. The European Union Treaty of Rome permits distortions of free trade resulting from
new price-based public health interventions where, in achieving their aims, these interventions
lead to additional advantages or fewer disadvantages to either public health or free trade than
would result from using pre-existing interventions such as taxation [13]. Arguments on this
point lie at the centre of the ongoing legal dispute between the Scottish Government and the
Scotch Whisky Association over minimum unit pricing (setting a minimum price per UK alco-
hol unit [8 g of pure ethanol]) and have relevance in Ireland, where minimum unit pricing is
part of the Public Health (Alcohol) Bill 2015, and England, where the policy remains “under
consideration”. Empirical evidence comparing the effects of different alcohol pricing policies is
currently lacking. While there is evidence about the equity implications of minimum unit pric-
ing policies [14], and recent evidence from a US state tax evaluation points to comparatively
larger effects on the health of disadvantaged groups [15], tax policy appraisals have to date
focussed on government revenue, consumption changes, and consumer spending, without con-
sidering impacts on public health and health inequalities [16–21].
Using England 2014/2015 as a case study, this paper sets out to appraise the relative public
health merits of minimum unit pricing and three of the most common tax structures globally.
It will provide estimated effects on alcohol consumption, consumer spending, and alcohol-
attributable mortality for the whole adult population and for subgroups defined by consump-
tion level and socioeconomic position.
Methods
Overview
The Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM), version 3, is a deterministic mathematical simula-
tion model providing a comprehensive framework for appraising UK and international policy
options [22]. It comprises an individual-based econometric component that estimates how
price changes affect individual-level alcohol consumption, and a cohort-based dynamic epide-
miological component that estimates how consumption changes affect the morbidity, mortal-
ity, and economic costs associated with 43 alcohol-attributable conditions. A full description of
the methodology and the data sources used is provided in S1 Appendix and S1 Data.
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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Current Tax System and Modelled Policies
Wemodel four common alcohol taxation and price policy options (see Box 2), each imple-
mented on top of the current system of excise duty and value added tax (VAT) in England
[23]. In England, duty rates for wine and cider are charged per hectolitre of product (not linked
to alcoholic strength); beer, spirits, and spirits-based alcopops are taxed by ethanol volume.
Final prices paid by consumers at the till include a 20% VAT, which is levied on all non-exempt
products and services and therefore not specific to alcohol. Special rates for very low strength
(2.8% alcohol by volume [ABV]) and high strength (>7.5% ABV) beers and ciders were not
modelled, as their market share is very small [24].
The focus of this paper is the differential effects of the four policies on population subgroups
defined by drinking level and income (for purchasing and consumption analyses) or socioeco-
nomic group (for health and health inequalities analyses; see below for more detail). As each
policy can be applied at different levels (e.g., higher or lower taxation/minimum unit price), a
uniform level needs to be identified to allow a valid comparison across policies. For political
relevance, we chose the level of each policy that would achieve a 4.3% reduction in population-
level mortality as this is the estimated impact of a £0.50 minimum unit price. This level of min-
imum unit pricing is a policy that is being considered or in the process of implementation by
all four UK governments, and a key political and legal question is whether existing tax powers
can achieve comparable effects.
Policy to Price
For details of sources of all model inputs, see S1 Data. The 2001–2009 Living Costs and Food
Surveys (LCF) [25] provide diary data for 227,933 on- and off-trade alcohol purchases by
46,163 individuals in England and also provide information on respondents’ equivalised house-
hold income (i.e., income adjusted to account for household size and structure). Baseline price
paid distributions (volumes purchased across price points) are calculated for ten modelled bev-
erage categories, which include beverage type and the location of purchase—beer, cider, wine,
spirits, and ready-to-drink beverages purchased either in the on-trade (i.e., in pubs, bars, clubs,
and restaurants) or off-trade (i.e., in shops including off-licenses and supermarkets) sector—
across population subgroups defined by age, gender, drinking level, and income. Market
research data from Nielsen and CGA Strategy were used to align LCF data with more robust
population-level price distributions (see S1 Appendix, Section 4.4). Office for National Statis-
tics alcohol-specific price indices were used to inflate to 2014 prices. For reporting, ready-to-
Box 1. Examples of Different Alcohol-Specific Taxation Structures
Australia: Beer and spirits are taxed by ethanol content (with strength-based thresholds
for beer and a lower rate for brandy than for other spirits); wine and cider are taxed by
value.
Germany: Beer and spirits are taxed by ethanol content; sparkling wine is taxed by vol-
ume; no duty is levied on still wine.
South Korea: Spirits are taxed by volume; all other alcohol is taxed by value.
Mexico: All beverage types are taxed by value (with strength-based tax bands).
UK: Spirits and beer are taxed by ethanol content (with strength-based tax bands for
beer); wine and cider are taxed by volume.
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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drink beverages are included with spirits as the vast majority of ready-to-drink beverages sold
in the UK fall within that category for taxation purposes.
To estimate the impact of tax changes on the price distribution of alcohol sold in England,
three steps are taken. First, we calculate the change in price for every individual LCF purchase
implied by the pricing policy. Second, we account for evidence from our previous analyses that
alcohol tax rises are not always passed on fully to consumers, particularly on cheaper products,
where part of the tax rise appears to be absorbed by retailers or their suppliers, a practice
known as undershifting [26]. Finally, we use the revised prices to generate new price distribu-
tions for each beverage category and population subgroup.
Price to Consumption
Baseline consumption data. The 2012 Health Survey for England (HSE) [27] provides
data on beverage-specific mean weekly and maximum daily alcohol consumption (consump-
tion on heaviest drinking day in the survey week) for a nationally representative sample of
6,394 individuals. The data were used to represent baseline consumption preferences for 120
population subgroups defined by gender, age (16–24, 25–34, 35–54 and 55+ y), consumption
level based on the English drinking guidelines prior to their revision in January 2016 (see
Tables 1 and 2), and income (quintiles based on household income equivalised to account for
Box 2. Specification of the Modelled Policies
Current tax increase: Raise current alcohol duty for all beverage categories by 13.4%.
Ad valorem tax: Introduce an additional 4.0% alcohol-specific sales tax on product value
after duty at the time of purchase (at which point the standard 20% VAT is also charged
on product (product value + ad valorem tax).
Volumetric tax: Replace current excise duty with a duty of £0.22 per unit for all beverage
types (UK unit = 8 g ethanol).
Minimum unit pricing: Introduce a floor price of £0.50 per alcohol unit within the cur-
rent tax system.
As implemented in the model
Basecase (current taxation): Price0 = (net price for retailer + existing beverage-specific
duty) × (100% + 20% VAT).
Current tax increase: Price1 = (net price for retailer + existing beverage-specific duty ×
[100% + 13.4%]) × (100% + 20% VAT).
Ad valorem tax: Price2 = (net price for retailer + existing beverage-specific duty) ×
(100% + 4.0%) × (100% + 20% VAT).
Volumetric tax: Price3 = (net price for retailer + £0.22 × number of alcohol units in
product) × (100% + 20% VAT).
Minimum unit pricing: Price4 = maximum of Price0 or (£0.50 × number of alcohol
units in product).
There is no change to any taxes in the rest of the supply chain, either at the production
or wholesale stages.
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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household size and structure). The HSE does not separate consumption into off- and on-trade,
and combines beer and cider, so each subgroup’s distribution of purchasing across these cate-
gories in the LCF was used to apportion the corresponding subgroup’s consumption in the
HSE. Sensitivity analyses relating to this apportioning are reported elsewhere [14].
Price elasticities. Price elasticities estimate how price changes in a product relate to pur-
chasing changes of the same and of related products (e.g., after a beer price increase, beer con-
sumption may decrease but spirits consumption may increase). Recently published UK
population-level own- and cross-price elasticities for alcohol demand in the ten beverage cate-
gories were used to model the relationship between price and consumption changes [28]. Each
subgroup in the population is therefore modelled as having a different overall alcohol price
elasticity due to (1) each beverage category having different own-price and cross-price elastici-
ties and (2) each subgroup having different proportions of their consumption within each bev-
erage category. It is also worth noting that different subgroups also face different price changes
due to variation in their purchasing preferences. Whilst the use of income- or consumption-
group-specific elasticities may seem appealing, the inclusion of such factors violates the
assumptions underlying the pseudo-panel methodology used to estimate the UK elasticities,
and we have therefore moved away from producing and using such estimates. However, as
reported in sensitivity analyses in the technical appendices of previous papers that used an
alternative methodology for estimating elasticities [14,29], the use of such disaggregated elastic-
ities did not change the direction of differences or overall conclusions.
To model policy effects on consumption, we use the revised price distributions to compute
the average percentage change in price within each beverage category and population sub-
group. We then apply the price elasticities to derive a percentage change in consumption for
each beverage category and subgroup. Finally, we apply this percentage change in consumption
to each individual within each subgroup, where subgroups are defined by age, gender, drinking
level, and income quintile. We do not model transitions between drinking groups, so where we
report on moderate drinkers, this refers to those meeting moderate drinking thresholds at base-
line rather than those who may have decreased their drinking to moderate levels in response to
policy. This does not, however, mean that their consumption is restricted to remain within the
bounds of the definition of moderate drinking. Note that as we deal with relative changes, we
Table 2. UK alcohol unit content of popular drinks (1 unit = 8 g [10 ml] of pure alcohol).
Drink UK Alcohol Unit Content
1 imperial pint (568 ml) of standard beer (4%) 2.3 units
1 small bottle (330 ml) of standard premium beer (5%) 1.7 units
1 small glass (125 ml) of wine (12%) 1.5 units
1 standard glass (175 ml) of wine (13%) 2.3 units
1 large glass (250 ml) of wine (14%) 3.5 units
1 single shot (25 ml) of spirits (40% ABV) 1 unit
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.t002
Table 1. Weekly consumption thresholds for drinking level groups.
Drinking Level Group UK Alcohol Units per Week Equivalent Grams of Ethanol per Week
Men Women Men Women
Moderate 21 14 166 g 111 g
Increasing risk >21 and 50 >14 and 35 >166 and 395 g >111 and 277 g
Heavy >50 >35 >395 g >277 g
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.t001
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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also do not model any transition between drinkers and abstainers. This is likely to mean that
our model underestimates the true effects of all four modelled policies as some consumers may
give up alcohol altogether in response to price increases.
Consumption to Harm
Having calculated changes in individual-level alcohol consumption over time, SAPM then
aggregates the modelled population into cohorts defined by age, gender, consumption level, and
socioeconomic group (three occupational groups: professional/managerial, intermediate, and
routine/manual/unemployed). The model then uses separate risk functions for 43 alcohol-attrib-
utable diseases and injuries to model the impacts of consumption changes on alcohol harm
within each cohort, including diseases (diabetes, ischaemic heart disease, and ischaemic stroke)
where alcohol may have beneficial effects for some groups (see S1 Appendix, Section 8.1).
For 14 chronic conditions partly attributable to alcohol (e.g., alcohol-related cancers), we
used risk functions from recent high-quality meta-analyses (see S1 Appendix, Section 8.1). For
nine partly attributable acute conditions (e.g., fall injuries), functions were estimated by linking
measures of consumption frequency, average occasion-specific consumption, and consump-
tion variability across occasions with injury risk [30,31]. For ten chronic and seven acute condi-
tions wholly attributable to alcohol (e.g., alcoholic liver disease, alcohol poisoning), we fitted
linear functions relating average or maximum daily consumption to absolute numbers of cases
reported (see S1 Appendix, Section 9.3.3).
The model operates in 1-y cycles: within each year the 43 risk functions are used to calculate
the condition-specific alcohol-attributable mortality risk for individuals within each cohort
given their consumption level. This risk is aggregated across all individuals in the cohort and
compared to the baseline risk under pre-policy consumption levels, and the ratio between the
two is used to adjust the baseline mortality rate and estimate the corresponding number of
deaths for that cohort and condition in that year. Baseline population demographics and all-
cause mortality rates (used to estimate background mortality from other, non-alcohol-related
causes) are taken from figures published by the Office for National Statistics (see S1 Data).
Baseline annual gender- and age-specific mortality data for each condition are taken from
recent English analyses [32] and apportioned between socioeconomic groups using published
evidence on socioeconomic gradients in mortality [33]. All consumption changes are assumed
to occur in the first year after intervention, but delays (time lags) between alcohol consumption
changes and effects on population-level harm are commonly observed and vary by disease. Lag
parameters were taken from a recent systematic review [34] (see table in S1 Appendix, Section
9.1). Maximum intervention effects in the model are reached after 20 y (the longest identified
lag time), and all harm results are reported for the 20th year following policy implementation.
Mortality results for years 1–19 are reported in S1 Appendix, Section 10.1.
Socioeconomic Position
There are two separate steps in the analysis which use different measures of socioeconomic
position. For the model relating price changes to consumption changes, we split the population
into income quintiles based on respondents’ equivalised household income. This approach
reflects that disposable income (rather than socioeconomic group) is considered a key driver of
alcohol purchasing. There is, however, reason to believe that differences in socioeconomic
group may drive health inequalities more than income. Also, unlike for income, condition-
specific mortality rates stratified by the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification
(NS-SEC) are available (see S1 Data), and so we model the effect of alcohol consumption
changes on deaths using socioeconomic group as the stratification variable. The HSE contains
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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both income and NS-SEC information for each individual, meaning no mapping between data
sources is required and no assumption is made regarding the relationship between these two
measures of socioeconomic position.
Sensitivity Analyses
SAPM version 3 is a fully deterministic model that does not produce confidence intervals
around its results. This is in large part due to the vast majority of the data sources used in the
model not providing estimates of uncertainty. However, we acknowledge the importance of
exploring the potential impact of such parameter uncertainty on model results and have previ-
ously undertaken extensive scenario analyses to this end. These analyses suggest that our
model estimates tend to be conservative and that using alternative assumptions would not
change the major conclusions of the model (e.g., [14,35]). For the present study we have taken
a new approach to characterising uncertainty in our results. Whilst we do not believe a full
probabilistic sensitivity analysis (PSA) is feasible, given the lack of parameterisation of uncer-
tainty available in much of the model input data, we have carried out partial PSAs around a
number of the key model inputs. For each of 30 PSA model runs, we drew a random nonpara-
metric bootstrap sample from the baseline consumption and purchasing survey datasets. We
also sampled the elasticities and tax pass-through parameters from the relevant distributions
given in their derivation. Finally, we used the limited available data on uncertainty around pub-
lished risk functions to estimate a parameterisation of uncertainty around the risk functions
used in the model. For each sampled set of model inputs, we ran all four modelled policies. As
a further exploration of uncertainty, we used recently published elasticity estimates from Her
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in the UK [36]. These estimates were derived using a very dif-
ferent methodology to that of Meng et al. [28] but use the same ten beverage categories. Full
details of these sensitivity analyses can be found in S1 Appendix, Section 11.
Results
Baseline Consumption and Spending Patterns
As the four modelled policies target different beverages and different parts of the beverage
price distributions, differential impacts of the modelled policies are partly explained by sub-
stantial subgroup variation in baseline alcohol consumption, baseline spending, and beverage
category preferences (see Table 3). For example, minimum unit pricing impacts cheap high-
strength alcohol found mainly in the off-trade sector, whereas, in absolute terms, ad valorem
taxes affect expensive and on-trade products more.
The relationship between income and mean consumption differs by drinking level. Whilst
the proportion of heavy drinkers in the highest income group (6%) is larger than in the lowest
income group (4.9%), heavy drinkers in the lowest income quintile have a higher mean con-
sumption than heavy drinkers in the highest income quintile (4,871 versus 3,622 units per
year). In contrast, among moderate drinkers, there is a positive relationship between drinking
level and income, whereby higher incomes are associated with higher mean consumption.
In terms of spending, the lowest income moderate drinker group spends the least (£228 per
year; less than 1% of gross equivalised household income), while heavy drinkers spend the
most irrespective of income (approximately £3,000 per year, which is almost 10% of mean
gross equivalised income in the lowest income quintile). Low-income heavy drinkers spend a
similar amount to high-income heavy drinkers, but consume a third more because they pay
substantially less per unit of alcohol (£0.63/unit on average versus £0.81/unit).
Fig 1 shows ten price bands (deciles of the price distribution of all alcohol) and the number
of units purchased in each band by each population subgroup. Moderate drinkers, even in the
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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Fig 1. Distribution of alcohol purchasing by income. This figure shows the average number of units purchased per moderate drinker per year for alcohol
across price bands, stratified by income. Moderate drinkers (a) purchase little alcohol overall and show a preference for middle and higher price bands, even
when having lower incomes. Increasing risk drinkers (b) purchase alcohol across all price bands, but there is a clear gradient whereby poorer drinkers
purchase more of the cheapest alcohol. Heavy drinkers (c)—across income quintiles, but especially poorer heavy drinkers—show a very clear preference for
cheaper alcohol. Price bands are deciles of the price distribution of all alcohol sold in England. Income groups are defined by equivalised income quintiles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.g001
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lowest income group, purchase very little of the cheapest alcohol. In contrast, both increasing
risk and heavy drinkers buy substantially more cheap alcohol than expensive alcohol, and this
is partly due to their strong preference for off-trade alcohol (cf. Table 4). Only the highest
income group of heavy drinkers spreads their spending across cheap, mid-price, and expensive
alcohol.
Policy Effects on Alcohol Consumption and Consumer Spending
Table 4 shows the policies’ estimated effects on average alcohol consumption and spending by
drinking level for the whole population and by income quintile. This table contains the deter-
ministic results, which represent our best estimate of policy effects. Equivalent results from the
partial PSA, including 95% uncertainty intervals (UIs), can be found in the tables in S1 Appen-
dix, Sections 12.8–12.11.
Population-level consumption reductions are similar for all four modelled tax policies
(ranging from −1.7% to −1.9%). When examined by drinking level, volumetric tax and mini-
mum unit pricing lead to the largest estimated consumption reductions among heavy drinkers
(current tax increase: −1.9% [mean PSA result (PSA) −2.3% (95% UI −4.5%, 0.0%)]; ad valo-
rem tax: −1.9% [PSA −2.2% (UI −3.4%, −0.8%)]; volumetric tax: −2.8% [PSA −3.7% (UI
−7.7%, −1.1%)]; minimum unit pricing: −3.3% [PSA −5.0% (UI −8.9%, −2.4%)]) and the small-
est reductions among moderate drinkers (current tax increase: −1.5% [PSA −1.9% (UI −3.4%,
−0.2%)]; ad valorem tax: −1.7% [PSA −1.9% (UI −3.0%, −0.4%)]; volumetric tax: −1.4% [PSA
−2.1% (UI −5.3%, +0.1%)]; minimum unit pricing: −0.9% [PSA −1.5% (UI −2.9%, −0.3%)]). In
absolute terms, a 1.5% consumption reduction is just four units per year for the average moder-
ate drinker, but a 1.9% reduction is 76 units for the average heavy drinker.
Responses to the different tax policies also vary by income group. Volumetric tax and mini-
mum unit pricing have the steepest income gradients for consumption effects, i.e., larger reduc-
tions in low-income groups and smaller reductions in high-income groups. This income
gradient for minimum unit pricing and volumetric taxation is steeper for heavy drinkers (in
both relative and absolute terms) than for moderate drinkers. A shallower income gradient is
seen for an increase of the current tax and ad valorem tax, with little variation in the gradient
by consumption group.
In terms of the consumer spending impact across income groups, we estimated that all four
policies would produce greater increases in spending on alcohol for higher earners. An increase
of the current tax would lead to the highest expenditure increases overall (+3.1% [PSA 2.8%
(UI 1.3%, 4.6%)]), with these being largest among heavy drinkers (+3.6% [PSA 3.3% (UI 1.4%,
5.2%)], or £106 per year in absolute terms) and smaller for moderate drinkers (+2.6% [PSA
2.3% (UI 0.8%, 4.2%)], or £8 per year). The ad valorem tax would prompt smaller changes in
expenditure (+2.2% overall [PSA 2.0% (UI 1.0%, 3.6%)]), with little subgroup variation. A vol-
umetric tax was estimated to slightly reduce spending overall (−0.8% [PSA −1.5% (UI −4.7%,
+1.0%)]), with declines in all but the highest income group. Further analyses show that
although the tax on beer and cider would increase under a volumetric tax of £0.22 per unit, the
tax on spirits would decrease, and, together with switching behaviour, this leads to an overall
reduction in spending. Minimum unit pricing would have a smaller impact on spending than
increasing the current tax or adding an ad valorem tax (+1.7% overall [PSA 1.0% (UI −0.9%,
+3.0%)]).
Considering consumption and spending together allows examination of how different
groups would balance decreasing their consumption versus increasing their spending. For
example, under minimum unit pricing, heavy drinkers in the poorest income quintile would
reduce their consumption (−7.6% [PSA −9.8% (UI −14.8%, −5.6%)]) while maintaining their
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
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Table 4. Policy effects on alcohol consumption and consumer spending, by drinking level and income group.
Drinker Group Income
Quintilea
Annual Alcohol Consumption Annual Consumer Spending
Baseline
Alcohol Units
per Year
Change in Units (Percent) Baseline
GBP per
Year
Change in GBP (Percent)
Current Tax
Increase
Ad Valorem
Tax
Volumetric
Tax
Minimum
Unit Pricing
Current Tax
Increase
Ad
Valorem
Tax
Volumetric
Tax
Minimum
Unit Pricing
Consumption level
All drinkers 710 −12 (−1.7%) −13 (−1.8%) −13 (−1.9%) −13 (−1.8%) 644 20 (3.1%) 14 (2.2%) −5 (−0.8%) 11 (1.7%)
Moderate drinkers 289 −4 (−1.5%) −5 (−1.7%) −4 (−1.4%) −3 (−0.9%) 322 8 (2.6%) 7 (2.3%) −1 (−0.3%) 2 (0.7%)
Increasing risk drinkers 1,397 −24 (−1.7%) −25 (−1.8%) −21 (−1.5%) −16 (−1.2%) 1,231 41 (3.3%) 27 (2.2%) −11 (−0.9%) 23 (1.9%)
Heavy drinkers 3,998 −78 (−1.9%) −75 (−1.9%) −110 (−2.8%) −134 (−3.3%) 2,933 106 (3.6%) 170 (2.1%) −99 (−1.4%) 81 (2.8%)
Consumption
level × income quintile
All drinkers Q1 (low) 748 −17 (−2.3%) −17 (−2.2%) −36 (−4.9%) −43 (−5.8%) 575 16 (2.8%) 11 (1.9%) −18 (−3.1%) 3 (0.6%)
Q2 582 −12 (−2.1%) −13 (−2.2%) −16 (−2.7%) −17 (−2.8%) 494 14 (2.9%) 10 (2.0%) −9 (−1.7%) 8 (1.7%)
Q3 665 −13 (−2.0%) −14 (−2.0%) −13 (−2.0%) −12 (−1.9%) 592 17 (2.9%) 12 (2.0%) −8 (−1.3%) 10 (1.7%)
Q4 701 −11 (−1.6%) −12 (−1.7%) −7 (−1.0%) −2 (−0.3%) 657 21 (3.1%) 15 (2.2%) −2 (−0.3%) 13 (2.0%)
Q5 (high) 841 −9 (−1.1%) −10 (−1.2%) 1 (0.1%) 3 (0.4%) 857 29 (3.4%) 22 (2.5%) 6 (0.7%) 17 (2.0%)
Moderate drinkers Q1 (low) 233 −5 (−2.2%) −5 (−2.1%) −7 (−3.1%) −7 (−2.9%) 228 5 (2.4%) 5 (2.1%) −5 (−2.0%) 0 (0.0%)
Q2 236 −5 (−1.9%) −5 (−2.0%) −6 (−2.5%) −4 (−1.8%) 239 6 (2.5%) 5 (2.1%) −4 (−1.6%) 2 (0.6%)
Q3 285 −5 (−1.8%) −5 (−1.9%) −4 (−1.4%) −2 (−0.8%) 300 7 (2.5%) 6 (2.1%) −2 (−0.6%) 3 (0.9%)
Q4 321 −4 (−1.4%) −5 (−1.6%) −4 (−1.1%) −1 (−0.2%) 364 9 (2.6%) 8 (2.2%) 0 (−0.1%) 4 (1.0%)
Q5 (high) 359 −3 (−0.9%) −4 (−1.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.1%) 465 13 (2.7%) 12 (2.6%) 5 (1.0%) 4 (0.8%)
Increasing risk drinkers Q1 (low) 1,426 −36 (−2.5%) −36 (−2.6%) −69 (−4.9%) −73 (−5.1%) 1,169 32 (2.7%) 21 (1.8%) −42 (−3.6%) 8 (0.7%)
Q2 1,414 −32 (−2.3%) −32 (−2.3%) −38 (−2.7%) −37 (−2.6%) 1,152 33 (2.9%) 20 (1.7%) −21 (−1.8%) 18 (1.6%)
Q3 1,365 −25 (−1.9%) −26 (−1.9%) −21 (−1.5%) −15 (−1.1%) 1,176 39 (3.3%) 25 (2.2%) −16 (−1.4%) 25 (2.1%)
Q4 1,393 −22 (−1.6%) −23 (−1.7%) −9 (−0.6%) −1 (−0.1%) 1,204 42 (3.5%) 27 (2.3%) −2 (−0.2%) 28 (2.3%)
Q5 (high) 1,400 −16 (−1.2%) −18 (−1.3%) 0 (0.0%) 7 (0.5%) 1,356 49 (3.6%) 34 (2.5%) 4 (0.3%) 28 (2.0%)
Heavy drinkers Q1 (low) 4,871 −107 (−2.2%) −101 (−2.1%) −282 (−5.8%) −372 (−7.6%) 3,060 99 (3.2%) 57 (1.9%) −113 (−3.7%) 28 (0.9%)
Q2 4,019 −89 (−2.2%) −86 (−2.1%) −122 (−3.0%) −165 (−4.1%) 2,881 105 (3.6%) 60 (2.1%) −53 (−1.9%) 94 (3.3%)
Q3 3,812 −93 (−2.4%) −89 (−2.3%) −125 (−3.3%) −151 (−4.0%) 2,851 89 (3.1%) 46 (1.6%) −67 (−2.4%) 62 (2.2%)
Q4 3,708 −64 (−1.7%) −65 (−1.8%) −53 (−1.4%) −24 (−0.7%) 2,908 109 (3.7%) 62 (2.1%) −19 (−0.7%) 100 (3.5%)
Q5 (high) 3,622 −46 (−1.3%) −45 (−1.2%) 7 (0.2%) 15 (0.4%) 2,942 123 (4.2%) 74 (2.5%) 29 (1.0%) 117 (4.0%)
aIncome quintiles (Q1 to Q5) are calculated based on the total population including abstainers. A higher proportion of those in the lowest income quintile
are abstainers than those in the higher income quintiles.
GBP, British pound.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.t004
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expenditure on alcohol (+0.9% [PSA 0.0% (UI −4.0%, +4.2%)]), whereas those in the richest
income quintile would maintain their drinking (+0.4% [PSA −0.5% (UI −4.3%, +3.1%)]) but
increase their expenditure (+4.0% [PSA 3.3% (UI 0.2%, 6.4%)]).
Policy Effects on Alcohol-Attributable Mortality
Table 5 shows each policy’s estimated impact on annual alcohol-related mortality by socioeco-
nomic (occupation) group. As policy “strength” (e.g., the size of the tax increase) is calibrated
to result in a modelled 4.3% total alcohol-related mortality reduction, our analysis allows for
straightforward examination of differential effects across population groups.
The policy impacts on moderate drinkers’ deaths per year are small across policies and
socioeconomic groups. In contrast, for heavy drinkers, there are large differences in how mor-
tality gains are distributed across socioeconomic groups with different policies. Volumetric tax
and minimum unit pricing in particular are estimated to substantially reduce mortality among
heavy drinkers in the routine/manual occupation group (current tax increase: −3.2% [PSA
−3.6% (UI −6.1%, −0.6%)]; ad valorem tax: −2.9% [PSA −3.3% (UI −5.1%, −1.7%)]; volumetric
tax: −6.1% [PSA −7.5% (UI −13.7%, −3.9%)]; minimum unit pricing: −7.8% [PSA −10.3% (UI
−16.7%, −7.0%)]). There is also substantial variation in impact in the professional/managerial
Table 5. Annual full effects of policies on alcohol-related deaths, by drinking level and socioeconomic group.
Drinking
Level Group
Occupation
Group
Percent of the
Total Drinker
Population
Deaths per
Year at
Baselinea
Percent Change in Number of Deaths per
Yearb
Absolute Change in Number of Deaths per
Year
Current
Tax
Increase
Ad
Valorem
Tax
Volumetric
Tax
Minimum
Unit
Pricing
Current
Tax
Increase
Ad
Valorem
Tax
Volumetric
Tax
Minimum
Unit
Pricing
Total
drinker
population
100.0% 12,190 −4.3% −4.3% −4.3% −4.3% −529 −530 −530 −530
All drinkers Routine/
manual
36.0% 6,223 −4.9% −4.8% −8.1% −8.9% −306 −296 −502 −551
Intermediate 24.5% 2,684 −4.3% −4.3% −2.5% −2.2% −115 −116 −66 −58
Professional/
managerial
38.8% 3,283 −3.3% −3.6% 1.2% 2.4% −108 −117 38 79
Moderate Routine/
manual
28.0% −691 3.4% 3.6% 4.5% 2.5% −24 −25 −31 −17
Intermediate 17.9% −855 0.9% 1.0% 0.6% 0.3% −8 −9 −5 −3
Professional/
managerial
28.6% −1,331 0.6% 0.8% 0.2% 0.0% −8 −10 −3 0
Increasing
risk
Routine/
manual
5.9% 2,260 −5.9% −6.0% −8.3% −7.6% −134 −135 −188 −172
Intermediate 5.1% 1,175 −5.0% −5.2% −2.1% −1.1% −59 −61 −24 −13
Professional/
managerial
8.3% 1,556 −3.8% −4.1% 2.3% 3.5% −59 −64 36 54
Heavy Routine/
manual
2.1% 4,654 −3.2% −2.9% −6.1% −7.8% −148 −137 −283 −362
Intermediate 1.5% 2,363 −2.1% −2.0% −1.6% −1.8% −49 −47 −37 −42
Professional/
managerial
1.9% 3,057 −1.3% −1.4% 0.2% 0.8% −41 −43 5 26
“Full effects” refers to annual effects in the 20th year following policy implementation.
aNet alcohol-attributable deaths are the sum of excess deaths and prevented deaths attributable to alcohol. In this column, negative numbers indicate that
in the absence of alcohol there would be more deaths; positive numbers indicate that without alcohol there would be fewer deaths.
bPercentage changes in italics represent overall decreases in deaths (they are a reduction from a negative deaths baseline).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.t005
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occupation group (current tax increase: −1.3% [PSA −1.8% (UI −4.7%, +1.6%)]; ad valorem
tax: −1.4% [PSA −1.9% (UI −3.6%, +0.4%)]; volumetric tax: +0.2% [PSA −0.8% (UI −6.9%,
+4.0%)]; minimum unit pricing: +0.8% [PSA −0.7% (UI −5.6%, +3.6%)]).
These results translate to differing impacts on health inequalities. Baseline alcohol-related
mortality rates are almost twice as high in the routine/manual occupation group compared to
the professional/managerial occupation group. All policies narrow health inequalities, but to
varying degrees. Figs 2 and 3 illustrate the estimated policy effects on health inequalities for all
drinkers and for heavy drinkers alone. Minimum unit pricing narrows the gap between socio-
economic groups the most, by considerably reducing the mortality rate for heavy drinkers in
the routine/manual occupation group and by slightly increasing the mortality rate for individu-
als in the professional/managerial occupation group. Volumetric taxation similarly achieves
large health inequality reductions, whereas increasing the current tax or adding an ad valorem
tax has more modest effects on health inequalities.
Sensitivity Analysis
PSA results for policy impacts on alcohol consumption by drinking level group are presented
visually in Fig 4. These results display two interesting features. The first is that the central,
deterministic estimate of effect is always smaller than the median PSA estimate, particularly for
the volumetric taxation and minimum unit pricing policies. This suggests that the central esti-
mates are likely to be conservative and also that values on the more pessimistic (in terms of the
scale of achievable effects of tax policies) end of the uncertainty spectrum affect the results by
only a small amount, but those on the more optimistic end of the spectrum lead to substantially
larger estimates of effect. The second feature is that, across all four modelled policies, the mag-
nitude of the uncertainty in effect differs for heavy drinkers versus moderate and increasing
risk drinkers. The magnitude of the uncertainty for moderate and increasing risk drinkers is
substantial in comparison to the estimated size of the effect. For heavy drinkers, however, the
results show that it is highly likely that minimum unit pricing and volumetric tax would reduce
health inequalities more than a rise in current taxation or introduction of an ad valorem tax.
The patterns of effects seen in the deterministic results are reflected in the PSA results. In par-
ticular, the minimum unit pricing and volumetric tax policies show greater differences between
the impacts on moderate drinkers and heavy drinkers than are seen for the current tax increase
and ad valorem tax policies.
Fig 5 illustrates the PSA results for policy effects on death rates, by socioeconomic group.
These results again suggest that the deterministic model estimates above are conservative, par-
ticularly for the volumetric taxation and minimum unit pricing policies. Whilst the determin-
istic model suggests that a volumetric tax or minimum unit pricing would increase deaths in
the highest socioeconomic group, the median PSA estimate suggests that deaths would
decrease marginally. Also of note is the fact that, while the uncertainty is greatest around these
two policies, their impact on deaths in lower socioeconomic groups is clearly greater than that
of the current tax increase and ad valorem tax policies.
Fig 6—like Figs 2 and 3 for the deterministic results—shows the PSA results for the reduc-
tion in the equity gap between the routine/manual and professional/managerial occupation
groups. In particular, the marked difference in impact by socioeconomic group for volumetric
taxation and, to a greater extent, minimum unit pricing means that the uncertainty around the
greater inequality-reducing effect of these policies relative to other options is minimal.
Overall, the PSA results suggest that the impact of uncertainty on model results is substan-
tial, particularly around the point estimates of policy effectiveness, but this uncertainty has few
implications for the main conclusions of the analysis. This is because there is considerably less
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Fig 2. Equity gap in the alcohol-related death rates between those in routine/manual and professional/
managerial occupations: total drinker population. This figure shows the effect of alcohol pricing policies
on the gap between alcohol-related death rates for drinkers in the highest and lowest socioeconomic
occupation groups. All policies reduce this gap, but volumetric tax and minimum unit pricing (“Minimum
Price”) have larger effects on the gap than ad valorem tax (“Sales Tax”) or increasing the UK’s current tax
(“Current Tax”).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.g002
Fig 3. Equity gap in the alcohol-related death rates between those in routine/manual and professional/
managerial occupations: heavy drinkers. This figure shows the effect of alcohol pricing policies on the gap
between alcohol-related death rates for heavy drinkers in the highest and lowest socioeconomic occupation
groups. All policies reduce this gap, but volumetric tax and minimum unit pricing (“Minimum Price”) have
larger effects on the gap than ad valorem tax (“Sales Tax”) or increasing the UK’s current tax (“Current Tax”).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.g003
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uncertainty around the relative effectiveness of the four policies, with volumetric taxation and
minimum unit pricing consistently outperforming an increase of the current tax and ad valo-
rem taxation, both in terms of specifically targeting the heaviest drinkers and in terms of reduc-
ing alcohol-related health inequalities. For example, while the most optimistic estimate of the
impact of a rise in current tax exceeds the most pessimistic estimate of the impact of minimum
unit pricing, the relative ranking of the policies is largely maintained across the 30 PSA sam-
ples. In 26 out of 30 PSA runs, volumetric taxation leads to a greater reduction in deaths in the
routine/manual occupation group than an increase in the current tax, while minimum unit
pricing exceeds volumetric tax on this outcome in 21 out of 30 model runs and exceeds an
increase in the current tax in 30 out of 30 runs. Full PSA results are presented in S1 Appendix,
Section 12.
Results for the additional deterministic sensitivity analysis using alternative elasticities
derived by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs are presented in the table in S1 Appendix, Sec-
tion 11.3, and show that using this alternative input makes little difference to the overall con-
clusions. Overall reductions in consumption are, however, estimated to be somewhat greater
for all policies, particularly for minimum unit pricing.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this study is the first to estimate how four key alcohol taxation and price
control systems compare in their targeting of key population subgroups and reducing health
disparities between socioeconomic groups. While all policies were estimated to reduce health
inequalities because drinking is associated with substantially higher absolute health risks in
lower socioeconomic groups than in higher socioeconomic groups [37], the scale of the
Fig 4. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis results for policy impacts on consumption by drinking level
group. This figure shows the uncertainty in estimated policy impacts on alcohol consumption by drinking
level group generated from 30 PSA runs. Whiskers represent maximum and minimum values. Boxes
represent interquartile ranges. Mid-box lines represent medians. Red lines represent the baseline
(deterministic) results. AV, ad valorem tax; CT, current tax increase; MUP, minimum unit pricing; VT,
volumetric tax.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.g004
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inequality reduction varied across the policies. A £0.50 minimum unit price and a £0.22 per
unit volumetric tax were estimated to reduce inequalities the most because heavy drinkers in
lower socioeconomic groups buy proportionately more of the cheap alcohol most affected by
these policies. Estimated impacts on health inequalities were smaller for a 4.0% alcohol ad valo-
rem tax and a 13.4% current duty increase as price increases were more evenly distributed
across the alcohol consumed by different socioeconomic groups.
Our study incorporates evidence of differential pass through of alcohol taxes across prod-
ucts and prices [26] and builds on our previous modelling of the equity implications of mini-
mum unit pricing [14] by incorporating an improved model of the relationship between mean
weekly alcohol consumption and occasion-specific drinking [6]. Study limitations include
reducing model complexity by not considering a newly introduced but largely ineffective ban
on below-tax alcohol sales [29], low- and high-strength duty rates covering small shares of the
market [24], and the impact of tax fraud or retailer non-compliance with minimum unit prices.
Whilst the operation of many tax avoidance schemes might be similar for the three tax policies
(illicit production and trade, counterfeit labels, exploitation of EU tax rules, and use of false
importation documents), it is possible that the scale of tax avoidance might vary between poli-
cies given the different revenue implications [38,39]. For minimum unit pricing, where the
additional revenue from increased prices stays with the retailer, this policy non-compliance
may be less of a problem but will require monitoring. No data currently exist that would allow
us to derive assumptions on likely effects. Further, for beverage categories not currently taxed
by their ethanol content (wine and cider), we assumed the alcoholic strength estimated from
market research. A further limitation of the cohort-based harm modelling approach used in
SAPM is that of “mortality selection” [40], although this is likely to be only a minor source of
error in the results presented (see S1 Appendix, Section 9.7, for more details). Moreover, whilst
Fig 5. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis results for policy impacts on deaths by socioeconomic group.
This figure shows the uncertainty in estimated policy impacts on death rates by socioeconomic group
generated from 30 PSA runs. Whiskers represent maximum and minimum values. Boxes represent
interquartile ranges. Mid-box lines represent medians. Red lines represent the baseline (deterministic)
results. AV, ad valorem tax; CT, current tax increase; MUP, minimum unit pricing; VT, volumetric tax.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.g005
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considering population heterogeneity is key to understanding policy effects [41], the resulting
level of disaggregation in the model means that some subgroups are represented by small num-
bers of HSE respondents and thus are subject to higher levels of uncertainty in terms of model
outcomes. The effects of this are examined through the use of nonparametric bootstrapping in
the PSA. The bootstrap method is the appropriate approach to take here as its use means that
those subgroups with smaller sample sizes will have greater variance across samples in con-
sumption levels and consequently alcohol-related deaths than subgroups with larger numbers
within the HSE. The partial PSA presented here represents the most comprehensive evaluation
to date of uncertainty in the outputs of SAPM, although, being partial, it does not account for
either the full uncertainty across all parameters or the full intercorrelation of these uncertain-
ties. An important avenue of future research in the development of complex models should be
the development of robust methods to quantify uncertainty in parameters for which no pub-
lished uncertainty data exist and, crucially, to estimate the correlation structure between poten-
tially thousands of input parameters (as is the case for SAPM). Additional limitations typical to
alcohol research apply, including the uncertainty about the size and distribution of cardio-pro-
tective effects of alcohol. No adjustment was made for the under-coverage of self-reported alco-
hol consumption relative to sales data [42] because most of the risk functions used in the
model are also derived from survey data likely to suffer from similar under-coverage. Further
epidemiological work should be a key focus of future research in order to facilitate a greater
understanding of the impact of undercoverage on policy analyses.
Fig 6. Probabilistic sensitivity analysis results for policy impacts on health inequalities. This figure
shows PSA results for policy impacts on the equity gap in alcohol-related death rates between the routine/
manual and professional/managerial occupation groups. The overall plot represents uncertainty generated
from 30 PSA runs. Whiskers represent maximum and minimum values. Boxes represent interquartile ranges.
Mid-box lines represent medians. Red lines represent the baseline (deterministic) results. AV, ad valorem
tax; CT, current tax increase; MUP, minimum unit pricing; VT, volumetric tax.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.g006
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There are several implications for national and international policymakers to consider. The
results demonstrate that minimum unit pricing and volumetric taxation can target consump-
tion and harm reductions in economically disadvantaged heavy drinkers in a way that duty
increases under the current UK tax system cannot. For harmful drinkers only, both policies
could be considered “regressive” with regard to consumption and spending, with a potentially
associated loss of consumer satisfaction. However, the trade-off is that both policies are pro-
gressive with regard to the resulting health gains, which are concentrated in disadvantaged
groups of harmful drinkers. These disadvantaged drinkers are at greater risk of health harm
from high alcohol consumption than more advantaged counterparts consuming similar
amounts [37]. Thus, minimum unit pricing and volumetric taxation would reduce health
inequalities, precisely target those at greatest risk of harm, and avoid unnecessarily penalising
those with low incomes who drink in moderation.
Minimum unit pricing is under consideration in several EU countries. Its legality under
European Union law depends in part on its ability to achieve additional advantages or fewer
disadvantages for public health and free trade compared to existing policy options, particularly
tax increases under the current system (volumetric taxation is not currently possible in the EU
as taxation of wine and cider by ethanol content is prohibited). This study suggests that, com-
pared to a commensurate increase in existing alcohol taxes, minimum unit pricing is more tar-
geted to the population at greatest risk of harm (i.e., disadvantaged heavy drinkers) and is thus
more effective in reducing health inequalities, a key public health goal. Applying a larger tax
increase could achieve a similar mortality reduction among disadvantaged heavy drinkers
without similar reductions in health inequalities; however, given that UK alcohol taxes are
already higher than in many comparable European countries, it is unclear whether an increased
tax would be viewed as being even more disadvantageous to free trade than minimum unit
pricing. Although a European court case was brought against the attempts by Austria, France,
and Ireland to introduce minimum retail prices for tobacco in 2010, at that time there was lim-
ited evidence regarding the likely effects of minimum pricing on tobacco consumption, harm,
and the distribution of harm reductions, or regarding differential undershifting of tax, such
that cheap products are less affected by tax rise. At the time, the court concluded that public
health objectives could be achieved by duty rises in combination with bans of below-cost selling
(cost price plus all taxes) [43]. The current judgment may set legal precedent not just for mini-
mum pricing for alcohol, but also for potential future policies relating to other commodities
such as sugar and fat.
Although our analyses use a UK baseline, the findings have international relevance beyond
their implications for European Union health law. The modelled taxation policies represent the
predominant alcohol taxation structures globally, and almost every developed country in the
world implements one of, or a mixture of, these policies [11]. While baseline patterns of drink-
ing, beverage preferences, and mortality data are UK-specific, there is comparable evidence
internationally that disadvantaged drinkers incur more harm for the same pattern of consump-
tion [37] and that heavy drinkers disproportionately purchase lower priced products [44]. The
implied overall elasticities used in the model are in line with meta-analytic estimates [7]. As
lower priced products are targeted by minimum pricing and volumetric taxation, the general
conclusions are expected to transfer to other countries. However, exact reductions in mortality
and inequalities would vary, and it would be desirable to replicate our analyses for other coun-
tries. Future work should also address the likely effect of price policy combinations (such as tax
rises plus minimum unit pricing, or VAT plus volumetric taxation).
There have been a number of international efforts to produce alcohol policy analysis models
similar to SAPM [39,45], although these have lacked either the structural detail (e.g., the sub-
group analyses and broad range of outcomes presented here) or the robust underlying data
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sources available in the UK. In order to internationalise our analyses, we have previously
adapted SAPM to each of the four UK countries, Ireland, and Canada and, as part of this pro-
cess, replaced English data with the best available local data where feasible [46–50]. These
models have proved useful in policy debate, but repetition of this process for each country
interested in, and requiring evidence on, minimum unit pricing would be inefficient. A means
of adjusting policy effectiveness estimates to account for national variations in key parameters
is required. We have previously addressed this problem using a “meta-modelling” approach
when appraising variation in the cost-effectiveness of identification and brief advice policies
aiming to reduce alcohol consumption in four European countries [51]. This meta-modelling
used a regression approach to describe key model outputs as a function of national-level vari-
ables (e.g., baseline alcohol consumption, baseline levels of alcohol-attributable harm). This
regression can then be used to appraise policies across a wider set of countries. A similar meta-
model could potentially be constructed for alcohol pricing policies, although a key prerequisite
would be sufficient data availability on key parameters (e.g., baseline alcohol consumption,
spending, and alcohol-related harms) to permit construction of a heterogeneous set of national
models on which the regression model could be based. To this end, international standardisa-
tion of relevant data would facilitate cross-national health policy analysis.
In conclusion, policy-induced price increases would lead to decreases in consumption and
alcohol-related harm. There are, however, important differences in how well different policy
options would target those who are most at risk of harm from their drinking. If achieving
reductions in health inequalities is a priority, then the two policy options that target cheap,
high-strength alcohol—minimum unit pricing and volumetric taxation—outperform ad valo-
rem taxation and increasing the current UK tax. Importantly, unlike other tax options, these
two policies target harmful drinking without at the same time targeting those in poorer popula-
tion groups who do not engage in harmful drinking behaviour.
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Editors' Summary
Background
People have drunk alcoholic beverages throughout history. However, harmful alcohol con-
sumption is currently responsible for around 2.7 million deaths every year and is a leading
risk factor worldwide for heart disease, liver disease, and many other health problems. It
also affects the well-being and health of people around those who drink, both within the
household and through alcohol-related crime and road traffic crashes. As with most prod-
ucts, the price of alcohol influences how much people buy and consume. Alcohol afford-
ability is an important driver of alcohol consumption, and in many countries, including
the UK and US, alcohol prices have not kept pace with inflation and rising incomes. Alco-
hol taxes have the dual function of raising revenues and regulating alcohol prices. Different
countries employ different alcohol-specific taxation structures including taxation by bev-
erage volume, by value, or by alcohol content. Some countries also have additional price
control measures that prevent the sale of very cheap alcohol.
WhyWas This Study Done?
Although research shows that increases in the price of alcohol brought about by taxation
or other pricing policies reduce alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm, little is
known about how alternative tax and price policy options affect the scale and distribution
of alcohol-related health impacts across society. This is important because people with
lower social status and/or income are disproportionately affected by alcohol-related dis-
ease. An effective public health policy to reduce alcohol harm might, therefore, help to
reduce social disparities in health (health inequality), a major goal of population health
policies in affluent countries.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find?
Here, the researchers use the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) to investigate the
effects of four common alcohol taxation and price policies on health inequalities in
England during 2014/2015. SAPM is a deterministic mathematical simulation model that
estimates how price changes affect individual-level alcohol consumption and how con-
sumption changes affect the illnesses (morbidity), deaths (mortality), and economic costs
associated with 43 alcohol-attributable conditions. The researchers used SAPM to simulate
the effect of increasing the existing UK duty on all alcohol products by 13.4% (current tax
increase), introducing a 4% tax based on product price (value-based, or ad valorem, taxa-
tion), introducing a tax of £0.22 per alcohol unit (strength-based, or volumetric, taxation),
or setting a minimum price threshold of £0.50 per alcohol unit (minimum unit pricing).
The magnitudes of the different policy-induced price increases modeled were chosen to
result in the same overall population-wide 4.3% decrease in alcohol-related mortality.
Notably, the impacts of policy changes on moderate drinkers were small, regardless of
income/socioeconomic group. However, among heavy drinkers, the effects of the four pol-
icies were differentially distributed across the population. Among heavy drinkers in the
lowest socioeconomic group (the population group at greatest risk of harm from alcohol
use), the estimated effects on mortality rates were −3.2% for the current tax increase (that
is, it reduced alcohol-related deaths by 3.2%), −2.9% for value-based taxation, −6.1% for
strength-based taxation, and −7.8% for minimum unit pricing. Among heavy drinkers in
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the highest socioeconomic group, the corresponding effects on mortality rates were −1.3%,
−1.4%, +0.2%, and +0.8%.
What Do These Findings Mean?
As with any policy modelling, the accuracy of these findings depends on the evidence base,
the quality of the data incorporated into the model, and the assumptions used. Limitations
to the analysis here include that, due to an absence of evidence, the researchers have not
examined the impact of any tax avoidance, which could potentially vary between the poli-
cies. The study findings suggest that in England (and probably in other countries) the
introduction of strength-based taxation or minimum unit pricing would lead to larger
reductions in health inequalities among heavy drinkers than an increase in the current tax
rate or the introduction of value-based taxation. That is, the two policy options that target
cheap, high-strength alcohol are likely to outperform value-based taxation and increasing
the current UK tax in terms of reducing health inequalities. Thus, although these policies
might be considered “regressive” (i.e., affecting the poor more than the rich) in terms of
consumption and spending, they are at the same time “progressive” in that they reduce
health inequalities. Finally, these findings suggest that minimum unit pricing and
strength-based taxation, unlike the other two options tested, would target harmful drink-
ing without unnecessarily penalizing people with low incomes who drink moderate
amounts of alcohol.
Additional Information
This list of resources contains links that can be accessed when viewing the PDF on a device
or via the online version of the article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963.
• TheWorld Health Organization provides detailed information about alcohol, including
a fact sheet on the harmful use of alcohol; its Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health
2014 provides country information on the impact of alcohol use on health and policy
responses; its Global Strategy to Reduce Harmful Use of Alcohol includes information on
pricing policies; the Global Information System on Alcohol and Health provides further
information about alcohol control policies
• The US National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism has information about
alcohol and its effects on health; it provides interactive worksheets to help people evalu-
ate their drinking and decide whether and how to make a change
• The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provides information on alcohol
and public health and a fact sheet on preventing excessive alcohol use
• The UK National Health Service Choices website provides detailed information about
drinking and alcohol, including information on the risks of drinking too much, tools for
calculating alcohol consumption, and personal stories
• EuroCare is an alliance of non-governmental public health and social organizations
working on the prevention and reduction of alcohol-related harm in Europe; it provides
information about alcohol taxation in the European Union
• The UK Institute of Alcohol Studies advocates for the use of scientific evidence in policy-
making to reduce alcohol-related harm and produces easily accessible briefings on alco-
hol policy issues
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• MedlinePlus provides links to many other resources on alcohol
• Information about the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model is available
• The UK Chief Medical Officers’ proposed new alcohol guidelines are available
Estimated Effects of Alcohol Price Policies on Health Inequalities
PLOSMedicine | DOI:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001963 February 23, 2016 27 / 27
